|
|
THE UNIT
| # | Target Area | Date | Target | Lead Crew | Command Pilot | Ordinance | B-17s Lost | Claims |
| 22 | Munster, Germany | 10-Oct-43 | Marshalling Yard | Lt. J. Geary | Maj. Hansel | 192 x 500lb General Purpose | 8 | 62-7-8 |
On the morning of 10 October 1943 the briefed target was the built-up section of Munster, a rail center north of the Ruhr Valley.
There was nothing unusual in the importance of the target. The Royal Air Force had been unable to eliminate this populated area as they had other parts of the Ruhr. The idea of the operation was to wipe out the built-up area and disrupt the people as much as possible.
Within a radius of a hundred and thirty miles, the logical striking distance of German fighter planes in preventing a bomb run, the crews were told that a maximum of 245 single engine and 290 twin engine aircraft could oppose the operation.
As they approached Munster, the three Groups that composed the 13th Combat Wing were hit in the most violent and concentrated attack yet made on an Eighth Air Force formation.
Nearly 250 enemy planes engaged the Wing and fought viciously until the Fortresses had bombed. The attacks, which lasted for forty-five minutes, appeared to have a definite method. The enemy approached in groups, attacked on their own in formations of from 3 to 6 planes, and flew level and straight at their targets. The attacks were pressed up to fifty or seventy-five yards, then enemy aircraft turned, took violent evasive action, and kept coming back in for the attack.
They showed definite tendencies of concentrating attacks on one Group at a time, even to the point of flying through the lead Group to attack the low one (the 100th Group). After disposing of the 100th Group, the attack switched to the 390th, and then to the low squadron of the 95th Group.
When first encountered, the attacking aircraft would fly parallel to the formation, out of range, in groups of from 20 to 40 planes stacked in echelon down for frontal attacks. They would fly on ahead of the formation, and then peel in one or two at a time, attacking the lowest members. Many beam attacks from 4 to 8 o'clock were received by groups of 20 to 40 aircraft at a time.
At the time the fighters first hit the 100th Group, the formation was average. In two minutes' time the formation was broken up, and within seven minutes 12 of the 14 planes from the 100th Group were shot down.
The Luftwaffe then turned on the 390th and added some tactics never seen before by B-17 crews.
While the FW-190s and ME-109s were slipping through the formation, twin-engine fighters stayed out of range and fired explosive cannon shells from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred yards. JU-88s attacked with rockets from eight hundred to a thousand yards, and a new feature was the use of Dornier bombers, which flew parallel to the formation and fired rockets from a fifteen hundred yard range.
One rocket entered a plane's fuselage, but before it could explode a gunner picked it up and threw it overboard. He described it as a one pound dry cell battery with one end of tin, like a stovepipe.
P-47 Thunderbolt escorts finally came to the rescue and drove the enemy away.
Statistics on the operation were amazing. A tabulation shows the terrific concentration of the attack.
| Aircraft Sent |
Aircraft Lost |
Claims | |
| 3rd Bomb Division | 133 | 29 | 180-21-49 |
| 13th Combat Wing | 53 | 25 | 105-13-28 |
| 100th Bomb Group | 14 | 12 | 2-1-1 |
| 95th Bomb Group | 20 | 5 | 41-5-19 |
| 390th Bomb Group | 19 | 8 | 62-7-8 |
When the 390th Group return to base their was cause to debate the future of the heavy bombardment program. The crews who returned were unaware that many Groups bombed that day without seeing an enemy plane. All that they realized was that they had scored some sort of Pyrrhic victory. They had shot round upon round of ammunition at enemy planes. As some gunners put it, "We didn't have to aim. We just pulled the triggers… something was bound to get hit."
In destroying 62 enemy planes the Group established a record for heavy bombardment groups that was never equaled. But in losing eight of their number, the Group lost much faith in the credo of B-17 firepower. They knew formation flying was good but they did not see how it could stand up when outnumbered twelve to one.
It was the blackest day in the Group's history. And to make it worse, on the return to the field heavy haze covered Framlingham. B-17s that were full of holes made as many as three approaches to land. Some landed cross-runway style. One, with seven hundred holes in it, limped into another base with half a crew. Another pilot of one of the Forts, with a leg shattered by cannon shell, stayed in a propped up position directing his co-pilot to the field.
In later days the Group spoke of the men of Munster as the British spoke of the men of Arnheim.
That they had bombed their assigned target with good results seemed an insignificant item. The bombs landed in the pattern of the 95th, covering the old part of town. Photographs taken twenty-four hours later revealed that the business and residential sections of the town were still burning.