TARGET MUNSTER
10 October 1943
By
Marshall B. Shore, Lt. Colonel, USAF (retired)
"Probably the most concentrated air battle fought by a B-17 combat bomb wing during the Second World War" was the description of this Munster mission by the highly respected and authoritative aviation historian, Roger Freeman. Major General Thomas S Jeffrey, Jr., United States Air Force; Ret. commented that this mission "was one of the toughest, if not the toughest, flown from England by the Eighth Air Force during World War II." Lt. Colonel Jeffrey was our Deputy Group Commander when this mission was flown. He later became Commander of the 100th Bombardment Group (H). Thirty crews from the 13th Combat Wing were lost and it was the worst single loss suffered by this wing during the war. This was the third mission in a series of four that were conducted over a period of seven days. Crewmembers were weary and aircraft ready for battle were greatly reduced in number. We were pushing ourselves to the maximum, as were the Germans.
In the theater less than three months, two of my required missions were finished with twenty-eight more to go. I was beginning to get the feel of flying aerial combat in World War II out of a B-17 bomber base in east Suffolk, England near
Framlingham. The British had bombed Munster in nighttime before us, but we were the first Wing of Eighth Air Force B-17Fs to hit Munster in daylight. Originally scheduled for a twelve noon bomb release, the target time was delayed late in the preparation stage until 1500 hours.
The P-47s escorting us did not have external fuel drop tanks yet, so they could only escort us to just before the Initial Point (IP). Another group of P-47s were to pick us up after the Rally Point (RP) and protect us from German fighter attacks on our withdrawal from the target and back to the English Channel on our way back to base. This left us vulnerable to unrestricted German Fighter attacks in the immediate target area. All Hell broke out and lasted continuously for a full forty-five minutes when our fighter escort left us.
My duty as Squadron Navigator of the 570th Bomb Squadron, 390th Bomb Group required me to fly as an extra navigator with our group lead aircraft. Eighth Air Force Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) provided that a command pilot and a navigator fly along with the lead aircraft of the Group, the Wing, the Air Division or the entire Eighth Air Force. I flew in one of these lead aircraft on all of my missions. The purpose of the command navigator was for him to be available to supply immediate navigational information to the command pilot so he did not have to bother the crew navigator who was keeping the whole formation on course to the target.
The command pilot on this mission was Major Ralph V Hansel, our Group Operations Officer. Ralph and I had become old friends, as he was a first lieutenant pilot flying navigators on their training missions back at Mather Army Air Base in 1942 when I was a cadet going through navigation school. I had flown with Ralph on perhaps a dozen occasions in training both at Mather and during our B-17 training days prior to our coming to England. Ralph had gone to Canada early in the war and earned his wings in the Royal Canadian Air Force. When the United States entered the war he and a flying buddy of his, David H. McKnight, transferred back to the Unites States Army Air Corps and ended up in B-17s. David flew his missions overseas with the 95th Bombardment Group.
The lead crew we were flying with this day was that of Captain James R Geary. His navigator was none other than the reliable Captain Nathaniel "Gus" Mencow well-known for being one of the best navigators in the group. Gus went on to become the 13th Combat Wing Navigator when he finished his twenty-five combat missions. Our Bombardier was Captain Gene O.
Wilms, the Group Bombardier who replaced the regular crew bombardier, 1st Lt. James R. McCarty for this mission. Other crewmembers, all gunners, were: Shirl J. Hoffman, Clarence W.
Medeck, Clifford Puckett, Paul B. Morris, and Donald F. May. We were flying in the good old reliable B-17F, No. 230434-A, named Betty
Boop, "Pistol Packin' Mama". She was the regular lead aircraft for the Geary crew.
Munster was located in the northwestern part of Germany one hundred and thirty miles due east of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Munster was a university city and a railroad and waterway junction for traffic going in and out of the Ruhr. The Royal Air Force had not been able to destroy much in the city and rail and waterway traffic was heavy and needed to be disrupted. The aiming point for some of the lead bombardiers were the main railroad station and associated rail yards. Other aiming points were along the main street leading through the city and in some neighborhood sections. Primarily these targets were selected to disrupt the population as much as possible and to inhibit their contribution to the war effort.
The weather briefing for the 3rd Air Division: Route Out - 3/10 to 5/10 patchy status, tops 2,000 feet, Visibility 1,000 to 1,500 yards. Haze layer to 7,000 feet. over England. Over North Sea 8/10 to 10/10 stratocumulus, tops 5,000 to 7,000 feet, haze layer to 7,000 feet. Visibility 4 to 15 miles. Over Continental coast, clouds breaking to 1/10 stratocumulus, inland clear. Visibility 5 miles in haze. Target: (Munster) - Clear, dense haze in general area becoming less dense near target. Visibility 5 miles. Return Route: Clear to coast, then 2/10 to 3/10 stratocumulus, increasing to 4/10 to 6/10 stratocumulus with further development in mid-channel to 7/10 to 9/10 stratocumulus, tops 5,000 to 6,000 feet. Clouds breaking to nil 5 miles inland over England. Visibility 6 to 8 miles in haze.
One hundred and thirty-three B-17s were dispatched from the seven bomb groups in the Third Air Division formation. The 13th Wing with 53 bombers led by the 95th Bomb Group that flew as lead of the division. The 390th Bomb Group was flying high and the 100th Bomb Group was flying low in the wing formation. Due to shortage of available aircraft in the 100th Bomb Group the 390th sent crews and planes to fill up their high squadron. This high squadron was being led by Captain Keith Harris of the 570th Bomb Squadron. Back in training with the 34th Bomb Group at Geiger Field in 1942 I had originally been assigned as the crew navigator with Keith Harris. We were both just out of flying school.
The 45th Combat wing with 40 bombers from the 96th and 388th Bomb Groups followed the 13th Combat Wing along the same route to the same target area. Following the 45th Combat Wing was the 4th Combat wing with 40 bombers from the 94th and 385th Bomb Groups.
The formation of the groups and the 13th Combat Wing proceeded in a normal sequence without major problems. We climbed on course to leave England ten miles south of course at an altitude of 25,100 feet and with a ground speed of 206 mph. Our indicated air speed was 150 mph. Over the continent we were joined by P-47 fighter escorts of the 352nd Fighter Group from their base in
Bodney, Norfolk. One squadron of twelve fighters gave us top cover at 3,000 feet above the bombers while the remaining two squadrons flew, one on each side of the long column of B-17s grinding their way toward Munster. What a comfortable feeling we had seeing these "little friends" sweeping wide from side to side to enable them to stay with the bombers who flew at a slower speed. All was quiet until just before the Initial Point (IP) when the fighter escort turned around and headed back to England because they had reached the limit of their range due to not having external drop tanks.
Just prior to the IP we began to see enemy aircraft coming alongside our bomber stream and preparing to make their individual attacks. I was riding in the nose on the right side of Pistol
Packin' Mama. I had one single .50 caliber Browning automatic machine gun for my use. Opposite me at the regular crew navigators' table, with another single .50 caliber gun, was "Gus"
Mencow. In the nose kneeling over the bombsight was Captain Gene Wilms who also had a single .50 caliber gun he could fire directly out of the nose when not working the bombsight.
We had plenty of ammunition. By this time it was common practice for the two navigators on these lead aircraft to each take along two full wood boxes of .50 caliber ammunition placed side by side to sit on, in place of the usual chairs that were provided. I folded my thirty pound flak vest and placed it on top of my two ammunition boxes and used this as a cushion. It was too heavy to wear when operating the gun and crawling around looking out of the windows to do pilotage and locate targets on the ground.
Since we were in a wing formation with the 95th Bomb Group leading, our job as navigators was not critical at this point in the mission. The pilots kept the formation on course by following the wing directly ahead. After turning at the IP toward the target, Gus worked closely with Gene to find and accurately identify the target out ahead. When they were sure they had the correct aiming point Gene immediately put his Nordon bombsight cross hairs on the aiming point, the main railway station in the center of the city of Munster. He then asked the pilot to center the Pilots' Direction Indicator
(PDI) and as soon as the needle of that instrument zeroed in and the aircraft was brought to straight and level flight, the pilot engaged the automatic pilot. From here on in to the target the aircraft the bombardier using the Nordon bombsight, which was connected directly to the autopilot until the bombs were released, controlled heading. All equipment worked smoothly and we had no problems on the bomb run except for the fighters who were our mortal enemy.
The first ones to attack us were ME109s and FW190s that began coming at us from straight ahead, one at a time, about every fifteen seconds. They were stacked up one behind the other and spaced apart a distance of about one hundred yards. You could aim only at one fighter at a time. The rate of closure was over 450 mph so they were not in firing range very long before they disappeared from our forward view to fly through our formation. They turned as they left and pulled off to one side to get out of the range of our guns, to fly out ahead of the bomber stream again, climbing in altitude to several hundred feet above our flight level so they could come and take another direct pass at the front of our formation.
In gunnery school we were taught to fire only short bursts. If you quit firing in a short burst you never got to pull the trigger again before the fighter was going by your aircraft. So when I got a fighter in my ring sight with the proper estimated lead, I just held the trigger down until the fighter passed out of my sight. I could see where my bullets were hitting because pieces of their canopy and fuselage were exploded out in all directions when the bullets hit their target. Empty shell casings from our guns fell to the floor and it wasn't long before the whole floor in the nose section was covered over three inches deep with expended .50 caliber casings.
Being the lead ship in the formation and flying in the front nose section the only attacking aircraft we saw from the front and being in range of our guns were the single engine fighters. There were more than the three of us could handle in the nose. Of course the upper turret gunner and the ball turret gunners were able to shoot forward as well and other ships flying in our group formation also zeroed in on some of the same fighters that were coming in from the front.
Conversations were short and limited on the interphone, but when a bomber was hit, or there was an explosion, the ships went down within sight of the gunners; these were called out for all to hear. Here are some of the events called out over the interphone concerning the 390th Bomb Group formation during our time over Germany, particularly during the forty-five minutes we were under intense fighter attack including the bomb run.
Aircraft 436 - last seen dropping out of the formation just before the target, no chutes. Aircraft 915 - No. 1 engine out and down with a wing on fire, 2 chutes seen. Aircraft 302 - No. 4 engine on fire near
Dorsten, aircraft going down, 2 chutes seen. Aircraft 262 - Hit by rocket near Gronau and blew up, 5 chutes seen. Aircraft 328 - Hit by rocket, tail came off, aircraft broke in two, no chutes. Aircraft 885 - Seen going down between IP and target, dropped bombs, 5 chutes seen. Aircraft 415 - Was hit by aircraft 328 and went down when it came apart in the air, 2 chutes seen. Aircraft 265 - Seen going down near the English coast on the return trip, 2 chutes seen.
Yes, we lost eight crews and aircraft out of the nineteen we started with that day. Of the fourteen dispatched by the 100th Bomb Group, they had only two aircraft make it back to England. The 95th Bomb Group lost five of the twenty they sent to war that day. The 13th Combat Wing had taken a real shellacking.
Sweeping his gun with the speeding image of a single engine fighter headed to fly through our formation on our left side, Gus Mencow got a direct hit and his target exploded right off to the side. This was only about 300 feet away from our aircraft and was seen by our pilot, Jim Geary, who confirmed that Gus had shot down an ME109. Comments from gunners on our aircraft came sporadically over the interphone when they made contact and caused a fighter to start smoking or obvious damage was seen, such as an explosion or fire breaking out from the engine of the fighter under attack. This became a real shooting gallery for all of us with a gun to use. Having to sit in his pilot's seat with no guns to fire, Jim Geary, became quite frustrated. He soon acquired a sub-machine gun that he used to shoot at fighters through his open left cockpit window when the aircraft was on autopilot.
Meantime, Gene Wilms was keeping the cross hairs of his Nordon bombsight on the
390th target at Munster. The Nordon sight was computing the time of drop. Bomb bay doors were opened in the group and finally the signal came from Gene that bombs had gone out and the command pilot called out loudly over the command channel, "bombs away". A turn was made to the left and we began to head for the rally point (RP). After watching the bombs go down and hit their target Gene was able to begin his second job of using his forward .50 caliber machine gun and join in the shooting sport. His job as bombardier for the group was now over. He returned to being just another gunner on our withdrawal route.
The most violent and concentrated attack yet received by any bomb group on a target over Germany was made on the 13th Combat Wing. The enemy aircraft totaled between 200 and 250 planes, mostly FW190s, ME109s, JU88s, ME210s, and ME110s. They attacked from just before the IP through the target, on to the Rally Point (RP) and beyond until our fighter escort came in sight to escort us out of Germany and across the channel. The attacks lasted about 45 minutes. The fighters had a definite method. The single engine fighters approached in groups, then attacked on their own, individually most usually from out in front of our formations.
Excerpts from the 3rd Bomb Division Intelligence Narrative Report for the mission tell better than I can remember about the whole affair. Here is that report as it came off the encrypted teletype in the hall across from my office in the Operations building:
"THE MOST VIOLENT AND CONCENTRATED ATTACK YET MADE ON THIS DIVISION BY E/A WAS ENCOUNTERED ON THIS MISSION. E/A ENGAGED TOTALED BETWEEN 200 - 250 PLANES, MOSTLY FW190S, ME109SL, JU 88S AND ME110S. THE CONCENTRATED ATTACKS, FROM THE IP THROUGH THE TARGET UNTIL FIGHTER ESCORT WAS PICKED UP, LASTED FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES. ATTACKS, FROM EVERY CLOCK POSITION, HIGH, LOW AND LEVEL, APPEARED TO HAVE A DEFINITE METHOD. E/A APPROACHED IN GROUPS, ATTACKED ON THEIR OWN IN FORMATIONS OF FROM 3-6 PLANES AND FLEW LEVEL AND STRAIGHT AT THEIR TARGETS. THE ATTACKS WERE PRESSED UP TO 50 - 75 YARDS THEN E/A TURNED, TOOK VIOLENT EVASIVE ACTION AND KEPT COMING BACK IN FOR THE ATTACK. THE ATTACKING E/A SHOWED DEFINITE TENDENCIES TO CONCENTRATE ATTACKS ON ONE GROUP AT A TIME EVEN TO THE POINT OF FLYING THROUGH THE LEAD GROUP TO ATTACK THE LOW (100TH). AFTER CONCENTRATING AND DISPOSING OF THE 100TH GROUP, THE ATTACK WAS SWITCHED TO THE 390TH, THEN TO THE 95TH (ESPECIALLY THE LOW SQUADRON). THE 100TH GROUP RECEIVED THE FIRST ATTACK AT 1435 HOURS AT 51- 45E. ATTACKING A/C WOULD FLY PARALLEL TO THE FORMATION, OUT OF RANGE IN GROUPS OF 20-40 STACKED IN ECHELON DOWN FOR FRONTAL ATTACKS. THEY WOULD PROCEED ON AHEAD OF THE FORMATION AND THEN PEEL IN, ONE OR TWO AT A TIME ATTACKING THE LOWEST MEMBERS. MANY BEAM ATTACKS FROM 4-8 O'CLOCK WERE RECEIVED BY GROUPS OF 20-40 E/A AT A TIME. AT THE TIME THE FIGHTERS FIRST HIT THE 100TH GROUP FORMATION WAS AVERAGE. TWO MINUTES AFTER THE CONCENTRATED ATTACK BEGAN THE FORMATION WAS WELL BROKEN UP AND IN SEVEN MINUTES THE ENTIRE GROUP WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED OR DISPERSED. AT A POINT BETWEEN THE IP AND THE BOMB RELEASE LINE THE GROUP LEADER OF THE 100TH RECEIVED HITS FROM BELOW WHICH CAUSED FIRES IN THE RADIO COMPARTMENT AND NO. 3 ENGINE. AFTER PASSING THE BOMB RELEASE LINE, HE DOVE OUT OF FORMATION, HIS NO. 2 AND 3 WING MEN PULLED OUT OF FORMATION AND FELL IN UPON THE SECOND ELEMENT. ACCORDING TO PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT THE GROUP LEFT THE 13TH CW FORMATION APPARENTLY UNDER CONTROL BETWEEN 1530 - 1540 HOURS. THE TWIN ENGINE FIGHTERS APPEARED TO STAY OUT OF RANGE OF ME 110S, FIRING AT FORMATION WITH LONG RANGE GUNS, SLUNG UNDER EACH WING AND LOBBING EXPLOSIVE CANNON SHELLS FROM 200 - 500 YARDS. JU88S ATTACKED FROM 800 - 1000 YARDS FIRING ROCKETS FROM UNDER EACH WING. (2 DISTINCT PUFFS WERE SEEN FROM EACH SHIP). THEIR FORMATION RESEMBLED OUR DEFENSIVE FORMATION. A NEW FEATURE WAS THE APPEARANCE OF ENEMY BOMBERS, FLYING PARALLEL TO OUR FORMATIONS AT 1500 YARDS, FIRING ROCKET GUNS. THESE E/A WERE DO 217S AND DO 215S.
This was quite a different story than that told by the returning flyers of the 1st Air Division. They dispatched 141 B-17s and lost only one aircraft. They did not get hit by fighters like we did. The Munster mission on the 10th of October was probably the blackest day experienced by the 390th Bomb Group in their entire tour in the
E.T.O.
Pistol Packin' Mama suffered flak damage to the wing and tail section. Eight of the other eleven returning 390th B-17s were damaged and required repair before flying again. The group lost one notable person on this mission who received national news coverage. That was 1st Lt. John Winant Jr., son of the U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain. Flying B-17 # 30262, Tech Supply, in the last element of the low squadron they received a direct hit by an air-to-air rocket after bombing the primary target and their aircraft exploded. Six parachutes emerged in rapid intervals before the bomber crashed at
Ladbergen, ten miles northwest of Munster. John Winant became a prisoner of war in the camp at
Sagan. Our pilot that day of Pistol Packin' Mama, Captain James Geary, was shot down while flying with the 100th Bomb Group later on in the war and the first person he met when he entered the
P.O.W. camp at Sagan was John Winant.
Memories - Years Later
During the 390th Bomb Group Veterans Association reunion in San Antonio in 1985, I purchased a copy of Munster, The Way it Was by Ian Hawkins of
Stowmarket, Suffolk, a noted writer of Air Force histories of World War II in Britain. I took this to my room after dinner that night at the hotel and started reading. It was so intimate and detailed and personal that I did not stop reading until the book was finished. Immediately I took up pen and paper and started writing to Ian Hawkins, calling his attention to some of the observations I had, especially of the comments made by various officers he had interviewed on the importance of the target and what the aiming points were. The criticism of the Air Force for selecting the residential areas of Munster for our target made by Ellis B. Scripture, the group navigator of the 95th Bomb Group, struck a signal in my memory bank.
In 1952 I was sent by the Air force out to Albuquerque, New Mexico to attend a month long course in The Characteristics and Effects of Atomic Weapons. This was a course taught at Sandia Base by instructors of the three services, Army, Navy and Air Force. My classmates were all field grade officers from these three services who were involved with weapons studies, targeting, for weapons use, or in staff or command jobs of combat units that would be involved in use of nuclear weapons.
The very first two hours of the course was taught by an Army Major in intelligence. He started out with the first discoveries made of the theories of nuclear materials by civilians in Europe. He then gave the history of the theories that had been propounded and the experiments that followed as the years went by. He covered the details of the discoveries and the competition between the British, Germans, Russians and the Americans for the use of uranium to develop a weapon of such magnitude that it could wipe whole cities off the face of the earth.
After a short break he started out the second hour with the statement: "Of course, the Mission to Munster on the 10th of October in 1943 was to try and catch the twelve German nuclear scientists who were coming in to the University of Munster on that day by train to discuss their progress of the construction of a nuclear weapon. They were scheduled to meet at the University of Munster. " Then he went on to talk about what the Germans had already done in the use of heavy water, which they thought would be instrumental in developing a hydrogen bomb. I remembered that the 390th Bomb Group had been sent to bomb a heavy water plant deep in the valley of
Rjukin, Norway on the 16th of November. This was only a month after the Munster raid. I had flown on that mission as well. These two missions now rang a bell. The targeting for the Munster mission that day just might have been different than what was stated in the Intelligence Annex of the Field Order. Maybe we were really out to get the German scientists.
I spent two days at the library of the Air University at Montgomery, Alabama looking for clues. I spent several hours reviewing this hypothesis with a senior researcher in the Air Force Archives of the Historical Research Center where all of the World War II records are kept. He had never come across any information of such a story about the Munster mission. Nothing came of this research.
Marked on my target list of further places to go was a plan to interview a couple of Air Vice Marshals of the Royal Air Force who were still alive, and who were on duty in London during the 1943 period. Unfortunately I have not been able to make this connection yet. Hopefully, I will able to come up with the answer before long. Some day I may get to the University of Munster to enquire about meetings that were to be held there on 10 October 1943. They just may have a record of a schedule for that meeting to be held by those German scientists.
David Irving wrote a book "The German Atomic Bomb, The History of Nuclear Research in Nazi Germany", 1967. While he included many details of German research and enumerated a number of important meetings held by German nuclear scientists during that period who were experimenting in nuclear bomb production, nothing was mentioned about the Munster mission. Several pages, however, did discuss in some detail the activities of the Germans in heavy water production and the bombing of the heavy water production facilities in Norway that were under German control.
So now I am left with no good answer for the Ian Hawkins version of the targeting for the Munster mission and must go along with his writing. His second edition of "Target Munster, The Way it Was" is entitled: "The Munster Raid, Bloody Skies Over Germany" and is in paperback. It is an improvement over the first edition. In July of 1999 I have just received a third edition of this Munster Mission written by Ian L. Hawkins and published by FNP MILITARY DIVISION located in Trumbull, Connecticut. It is entitled "The Munster Raid: Before and After". This is the best and most complete writing so far. Ian has done a superb job of documenting this mission, both before and years after. What a treasure to have of our wartime accomplishments. I value all these three of these books very highly.
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